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Abstract
Varieties of the Fan Theorem have recently been developed in reverse
constructive mathematics, corresponding to different continuity princi-
ples. They form a natural implicational hierarchy. Some of the implica-
tions have been shown to be strict, others strict in a weak context, and
yet others not at all, using disparate techniques. Here we present a family
of related Kripke models which separates all of the as yet identified fan
theorems.
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1 Introduction
To be able to talk about fans, Cantor space, and similar objects properly, we will
start by introducing some notation. The space of all infinite binary sequences,
endowed with the standard topology (wherein a basic open set is given by a finite
binary sequence), will be denoted by 2N; the set of all finite binary sequences
will be denoted by 2∗. The concatenation of u, v ∈ 2∗ will be denoted by u ∗ v.
For α ∈ 2N and n ∈ N, the first n elements of α form a finite sequence denoted
by αn. A subset B ⊆ 2∗ is called a bar if
∀α ∈ 2N∃n ∈ N(αn ∈ B),
and a bar is called uniform if
∃n ∈ N ∀α ∈ 2N ∃m 6 n (αm ∈ B).
Notice that if a bar B is closed under extensions, that is if
∀u ∈ 2∗(u ∈ B =⇒ ∀v ∈ 2∗ u ∗ v ∈ B),
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then it is uniform if and only if
∃n ∈ N ∀α ∈ 2N (αn ∈ B).
Not all of the bars we consider will be closed under extensions.
There are currently four versions of Brouwer’s Fan Theorem in common use.
All of them enable one to conclude that a given bar is uniform. The differences
among them lie in the definitional complexity demanded (as an upper bound)
of the bar in order for the theorem to apply to it, which ranges from the very
strongest requirement to no restriction on the bar at all. A bar C ⊂ 2∗ is
decidable if it is decidable as a set:
∀u ∈ 2∗ u ∈ C ∨ u 6∈ C.
A bar C ⊂ 2∗ is called a c-bar if there exists a decidable set C′ ⊂ 2∗ such that
u ∈ C ⇐⇒ ∀v ∈ 2∗ (u ∗ v ∈ C′) .
A bar B ⊂ 2∗ is called a Π01-bar if there exist a decidable set S ⊂ 2
∗ × N such
that
u ∈ B ⇐⇒ ∀n(u, n) ∈ S .
(The Π0n-nomenclature alludes to the arithmetical hierarchy in computability
theory.) We can now state four commonly used versions of the Fan Theorem.
FAN∆: Every decidable bar is uniform.
FANc: Every c-bar is uniform.
FANΠ0
1
: Every Π01-bar is uniform.
FANfull: Every bar is uniform.
Notice that every decidable bar can be taken to be closed under extensions;
that is, the closure of a decidable bar under extension is still decidable. If there
is no restriction on the definability of a bar, then every bar can be taken to be
so closed, by working with the closure of any given bar. Every c-bar is already
closed under extension. In contrast, Π01-bars seemingly cannot be replaced by
their closures while remaining Π01.
By way of motivation, these principles were developed within reverse con-
structive mathematics, because they are equivalent with certain continuity prin-
ciples. In particular, over a weak base theory, FAN∆ is equivalent with the
assertion that every uniformly continuous, positively valued function from [0,1]
to R has a positive infimum [8], FANc with the uniform continuity of every
continuous f : 2N → N [2], and FANΠ0
1
with the uniform equicontinuity of every
equicontinuous sequence of functions from [0,1] to R [6].
The following implications hold trivially [2, 5] and over a weak base theory:
FANfull =⇒ FANΠ0
1
=⇒ FANc =⇒ FAN∆.
One naturally wonders whether any of the implications can be reversed, includ-
ing whether FAN∆ is outright provable in constructive set theory. Some such
non-implications have already been determined.
• It is well-known (see [1] for instance) that FAN∆ is not provable, via
recursive realizability. That is, there is an infinite (Turing) computable
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sub-tree of 2∗ with no infinite computable branch, which fact translates to
a failure of FAN∆ under IZF (Intuitionistic ZF, the constructive correlate
to classical ZF) via recursive realizability, and also to the independence of
WKL (Weak Ko¨nig’s Lemma) over RCA0 in reverse mathematics [10].
• Berger [3] shows that FAN∆ does not imply FANc over a very weak base
system. His argument is in its essence a translation of the reverse mathe-
matics proof that WKL0 does not imply ACA [10], by coding the Turing
jump into a c-bar. In order for this argument to work, he must be in a
context in which the existence of the Turing jump is not outright provable,
hence the use of a weak base system.
• Fourman and Hyland [7] present a Heyting-valued, almost topological,
model in which FANfull fails; they do not address which fragments of the
Fan Theorem might hold, since these distinctions were not available at the
time. We show below that FANΠ0
1
holds in their model, separating the
left-most pair of principles in the diagram above.
We are not aware of any prior proofs separating FANc and FANΠ0
1
.
The goal of this paper is to separate all of these principles via a uniform
technique. This has several benefits. For one, it separates FANc and FANΠ0
1
.
For another, it separates FAN∆ and FANc over full IZF. That is new because
Berger’s argument still leaves open the possibility that IZF would allow that
implication to go through; independence of FANc over IZF + FAN∆ means
that it does not. In addition, since the arguments employed rather handily
provide four separation results, they seem to provide a flexible tool that might
be useful elsewhere. This seems not to be the case for the other techniques that
have been used. It could well be the case, for instance, that realizability could
produce all of the results discussed here. But no one has been able to do this yet.
As for the Fourman-Hyland argument, they also show in the same work that
all topological models satisfy FANfull. So for the separations of interest here,
topological models are just out. To be sure, variants of topological models,
along the lines used by Fourman and Hyland, might still do the trick. But
before coming up with the arguments below that’s exactly what we tried, and
got nowhere. In short, we cannot say that the techniques used here get you
anything that could not be gotten by other means, but at least it seems to be
easier to use. Beyond that, it could be the case that the proofs here really are
in some sense the right ones for these results. In the face of the perfectly nice
realizability and Heyting-valued models that provide some of these separations,
we are not at this point making that claim. While the constructions below are
natural enough, they are not so compelling as to seem canonical. Nonetheless,
since they seem to work so well, it might be that with further reflection and
development, it turns out that proofs along these lines are the way to go for a
large class of problems.
As for what the techniques employed actually are, we would like to provide
some motivation for how we happened upon them. Since it seemed that re-
alizability and Heyting algebras weren’t working, we turned to the only other
kind of model we know of, Kripke models. To build a tree we could control,
along with its paths, over set theory with full Separation and Collection, we
turned to forcing. In order to have the trees be decidable, yet not completely
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pinned down, as required by the theories in question, we were forced to use
non-standard integers, to provide non-standard levels on the trees.
Since this is a paper about constructive mathematics, a word about the
meta-theory used is in order. It is classical through and through. We work in
ZFC. Presumably most if not all of the arguments are fully constructive, as in
so many mathematical papers in all fields. We did not check, and so have no
idea.
In the next section we discuss the Fan Theorem in topological and re-
lated models, including giving a proof that the Fourman-Hyland model satisfies
FANΠ0
1
. The following sections provide the advertised separation results, going
right-to-left in the diagram above. We then close with some questions.
2 The Fan Theorem in Heyting-Valued Models
To make this paper somewhat self-contained, we repeat the proof that explains
why the construction afterwards is more complicated than just a topological
model.
Proposition 1. (Fourman-Hyland [7]) In any topological model FANfull holds.
Proof. Let T be a topological space, and suppose
T  “B ⊆ 2∗ is a bar closed under extension.”
Then, in particular, for any external sequence α ∈ 2N (that is, one from the
ground model)
(1) T = J∃n αn ∈ BK =
⋃
n∈N
Jαn ∈ BK .
Let Au denote the open set
Jthe bar {w | u ∗ w ∈ B} is uniformK .
If T 6 “B is uniform,” then choose some p /∈ A(). Define a set Tr = {u ∈ 2
∗ |
p 6∈ Au}. Since Au = Au∗0 ∩ Au∗1 for any u ∈ 2∗, Tr is a tree (i.e. closed
under restriction) with no terminal nodes. Since in addition () ∈ Tr (that is,
Tr is non-empty), Tr is infinite. Thus, by Weak Ko¨nig’s Lemma, there exists
an infinite path β in Tr. By the definition of Tr, p /∈ Aβn for all n ∈ N. Now
Equation 1 yields the existence of n ∈ N such that
p ∈ Jβn ∈ BK ;
but this contradicts Jβn ∈ BK ⊂ Aβn.
This suggests that if we are looking for models in which some form of the
Fan Theorem fails we need to “delete points”. This was done in [7], section
4, where they consider K(T ), the coperfect open sets of a topological space T .
This can be viewed as the equivalence classes of the open sets of T , under which
an open set is identified with its smallest coperfect superset. In this setting,
removing a point from an open set does not change the set.
Definition 1. A Heyting algebra is connected if A ∨ B = ⊤ and A ∧ B = ⊥
implies that either A = ⊤ or A = ⊥.
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Let Ω be K([0, 1]× [0, 1]). It is easy to see that Ω is connected.
Proposition 2. If H is a connected Heyting algebra, then H  FANΠ0
1
.
Proof. Suppose H  “B is a Π01-bar, given say by S : u ∈ B iff ∀n ∈ N (u, n) ∈
S.” Since H  “S is decidable,” for any u ∈ 2∗ and n ∈ N,
H  “(u, n) ∈ S ∨ (u, n) 6∈ S.”
By the connectedness of H either H  “(u, n) ∈ S” or H  “(u, n) 6∈ S.” So
define a set B˜ ⊂ 2∗ in the metatheory by
u ∈ B˜ ⇐⇒ ∀n ∈ N H  “(u, n) ∈ S.”
B˜ is itself a bar, as follows. Let α ∈ 2N be arbitrary. If αn /∈ B˜ for all n ∈ N
then for all n there exist in such that J(αn, in) ∈ BK = ⊥. Thus
J∀m ∈ N (αn,m) ∈ BK = ⊥
for any n ∈ N, and therefore
J∃n ∈ N∀m ∈ N (αn,m) ∈ BK = ⊥ ;
a contradiction to B being a bar internally. Hence B˜ is a bar externally, and
therefore, working with a classical metatheory (or simply the Fan Theorem),
it is uniform. So there exists N such that for all u of length N some initial
segment of u is in B˜. Then it is easy to see, that this same N witnesses the
uniformity of B internally.
Corollary 3. FANΠ0
1
does not imply FANfull (over IZF).
Proof. In [7] it shown that Ω 6 FANfull.
3 FAN∆ is not Provable
As discussed in the introduction, recursive realizability shows that IZF does not
prove FAN∆. However, we do not see how to adapt that, or the Heyting-valued
model from the previous section, to the other desired separation results. Hence
we are hoping not merely to provide here a different model falsifying FAN∆ as
a technical exercise, but rather to provide a technique more flexible than those
referenced, to produce the other separation results. Of course, if this really is a
flexible technique, it should work for the known separations too.
We will build a Kripke model, working within ZFC. To construct a bar, it
will be crucial to control what paths exist. This is most easily done with a
generic set, in the sense of forcing.
Definition 2. Let the forcing partial order P be the set of appropriate labelings
of finitely many nodes from 2∗. A labeling of nodes assigns to each one either
IN, OUT, or ∞, with the following restrictions. Any node labeled IN has no
descendant, the idea being that once a node gets into the eventual bar so are all
of its descendants automatically, so nothing more need be said. Any descendant
of a node labeled OUT must be labeled IN or OUT. Finally, for any node labeled
∞, if both children are labeled, then at least one of them must be labeled ∞.
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Let G be a generic through the condition that labels 〈〉 with∞. By straight-
forward density arguments, any node labeled OUT byG has a uniform bar above
it (or below it, depending on how you draw your trees) all labeled IN, and every
node labeled ∞ has a path through it always labeled ∞, in fact a perfect set of
such.
LetB = {α ∈ 2∗| for some n G(α ↾ n) = IN}. B ∈M [G] is the interpretation
σGB of the term σB = {〈p, αˆ〉 | for some n p(α ↾ n) = IN}. (As usual, the function
.ˆ is the canonical injection of the ground model into the terms: xˆ = {〈∅, yˆ〉 |
y ∈ x}.) Because of these latter ∞-paths, B is not a bar. However, we might
reasonably think that if we no longer had access to the distinction between the
OUT and the ∞ nodes, we might no longer be able to build a path avoiding B.
This intuition is confirmed by the next proposition.
Definition 3. The shadow forcing Q is the set of functions from finite subtrees
of 2∗ to {IN, OUT} such that any node labeled IN has no descendant. Equiv-
alently, Q is the sub-partial order of P beneath the condition labeling 〈〉 with
OUT (together with the condition which labels 〈〉 IN, which has no extension).
The canonical projection projQ of P onto Q replaces all occurrences of ∞ with
OUT. The canonical projection of the terms of P ’s forcing language to those of
Q’s, ambiguously also called projQ, acts by applying projQ to the conditions that
appear in the terms, hereditarily. (Notice that Q term are also P terms.)
Notice that a P -filter projects to a Q-filter. If G is a generic P -filter, then
projQ(G) will not be Q-generic, because in Q the terminal conditions are dense.
Still, projQ(G) induces an interpretation σ
projQ(G) of the terms σ of Q. These
interpretations are in M [G], as they are easily definable from σ and G; alterna-
tively, σprojQ(G) = (proj−1′′Q σ)
G.
For any P -filter G, projQ(σB)
projQ(G) = B: the induced interpretation of
the projection of B is just B itself. Effectively, B as a P -term is already a
Q-term.
Proposition 4. If σ is a Q-term and p P “proj
−1′′
Q σ is an infinite branch
through 2∗,” then p P “proj
−1′′
Q σ goes through σB.”
Proof. By standard forcing technology, it suffices to extend p to some condition
forcing “proj−1′′Q σ goes through σB ,” as then it will be dense beneath p to force
as much, and so will happen generically.
First extend p so that every sequence in 2∗ of length 2n−1 for some n either
is labeled OUT or ∞ or has a proper initial segment labeled IN. Then extend
again by adjoining both children to all nodes of length 2n−1, and labeling them
∞ whenever possible (otherwise IN or OUT). For a technical reason soon to
become clear, we must extend yet again. This time have the domain include all
length k descendants of the length n nodes not labeled IN, and label them so
that every length n node labeled∞ has a unique descendant of length k labeled
∞, and, most importantly, for each pair of nodes α and β of length k labeled
∞, there is some i with α(i) = 1 and β(i) = 0. One way of doing this is to let s
be the number of nodes of length n labeled ∞, to let k be n+ s, and to build
the ∞-labeled descendant of the jth such node by adjoining to it j − 1 0’s, a 1,
and then s− j 0’s, all other descendants of length k being labeled OUT.
Extend one last time to q  proj−1′′Q σ(kˆ) = αˆ for some fixed α, where as
usual xˆ is the standard term for the internalization of the set x. Moreover,
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q should force the equality in the strong sense that for each j < k there is a
term τ and a condition r ≥ q with 〈r, τ〉 ∈ proj−1′′Q σ and q  τ = 〈jˆ, αˆ(jˆ)〉;
even further, if α(j) = 1 then q forces a particular element to be in τ ’s second
component.
If q labels some initial segment of α IN then we’re done.
If q labels α OUT then it is dense beneath q that all descendants of α of
some fixed length are labeled IN, and again we’re done.
If q labels α ∞ then let qalt be identical to q except that all descendants of
α ↾ n labeled∞ by q are labeled OUT by qalt. Observe first that qalt extends p.
Then note that, because projQ(qalt) = projQ(q), the strong forcing facts posited
of q hold for qalt as well: for the same τ and j as above, qalt  τ ∈ proj
−1′′
Q σ and
qalt  “τ is an ordered pair with first component jˆ,” and if q forced τ ’s second
component to be non-empty, qalt also forces it to be non-empty, containing the
same term as for q. The difference between q and qalt, from σ’s point of view, is
that qalt has more extensions than q: there are conditions extending qalt which
bar the tree beneath α, which is not so for q. That means that it is possible
for extensions of qalt to force sets into Q-terms that no extension of q could.
In the case of proj−1′′Q σ(kˆ), though, such opportunities are limited. That term
is already forced by p to be a function with domain k; for each j < k there is
already a fixed term forced to stand for 〈j, (proj−1′′Q σ(kˆ))(j)〉; if that function
value at j was forced by q to be 1 then it must retain a member and so is also
forced by qalt to be 1. The only change possible is that something formerly
forced to be empty (i.e. be 0) could now be forced by some extension to have
an element (i.e. be 1). Recall, though, the construction of q on level k: if
proj−1′′Q σ(kˆ) is ever forced by some r ≤ qalt to be some β 6= α by flipping some
0’s to 1’s, by α’s distinguished 1 r cannot label β ∞. So r can be extended so
that all extensions of β of a certain length are labeled IN, forcing proj−1′′Q σ to
hit σB. Of course, any extension of qalt forcing proj
−1′′
Q σ(kˆ) to be α works the
same way as such an r does, since qalt already labels α OUT. In either case we
have an extension of p forcing proj−1′′Q σ go through σB .
Even though we have just seen that B is a bar relative to the Q-paths, we
will perhaps surprisingly have occasion to consider weaker situations, where B is
larger and hence even easier to hit. The case of interest is if we were to change
some ∞’s in G to OUTs, thereby allowing uniform bars above those nodes.
Notice that if α’s sibling is not labeled ∞, then α’s label could not consistently
be changed from ∞, as then α’s parent, labeled ∞, would then have both
children not labeled ∞. Such considerations do not apply when α = 〈〉.
Definition 4. H is a legal weakening of G if H can be constructed by choosing
finitely many nodes labeled∞ by G, changing those labels (to either IN or OUT),
also changing the labeling of finitely many descendants of those nodes from ∞
or OUT to OUT or IN in such a way that each node labeled OUT has a uniform
bar above it labeled IN, and then eliminating all descendants of nodes labeled IN.
Furthermore, this must be done in such a manner that H is a filter through P
(avoiding, for instance, the problem posed just before this definition).
Notice that the difference between H and G can be summarized in one con-
dition p, which contains the new bars, all labeled IN, and all of their ancestors.
Hence we use the notation Gp to stand for this H : to build Gp, make the
minimal change to each condition in G in order to be consistent with p.
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Lemma 5. If Gp is a legal weakening of G then Gp is generic through p.
Remark 6. Notice that if p labels the empty sequence IN or OUT then p = Gp
is a terminal condition in P , trivially satisfying the lemma.
Proof. Let D be dense beneath p. Notice that G ↾ dom(p) is a condition in
P contained in G. It is not hard to define the notion of projection beneath p,
projp, by making the minimal changes in a condition necessary to be compatible
with p. We claim that proj−1′′p D is dense beneath G ↾ dom(p). To see this,
let q ≤ G ↾ dom(p). Extend projp(q) to r ∈ D. The only way r can extend
projp(q) is by labeling extensions α of nodes which are unchanged by projp: if
α ∈ dom(r)\dom(projp(q)) then, for α ↾ n ∈ dom(q), q(α ↾ n) = projp(q)(α ↾
n). Extend q to qr by labeling those same extensions the same way: for α ∈
dom(r)\dom(projp(q)) qr(α) = r(α). We have that projp(qr) = r, hence qr ∈
proj−1′′p D. So proj
−1′′
p D is dense beneath G ↾ dom(p), hence contains a member
of G, say q. Then projp(q) is in both D and Gp.
We can now describe the ultimate Kripke model. Recall that G is generic for
P over M and labels the empty sequence with ∞. The bottom node ⊥ of the
Kripke model consists of the Q-terms, with membership (not equality!) as inter-
preted by projQ(G). Let N be an ultrapower of M [G] using any non-principal
ultrafilter on ω, with elementary embedding f : M [G] → N . This necessarily
produces non-standard integers. Let H be the set of legal weakenings of f(G),
as defined in N , which induce the same B on the standard levels of 2∗, which
restriction is definable only in M [G]. That is, any standard node labeled ∞
by G can only be changed to OUT by the legal weakening. H will index the
successors of ⊥. At the node indexed by f(G)p, the universe will be the Q-terms
of N as interpreted by projQ(f(G)p). Regarding the embeddings from ⊥, for
a Q-term σ ∈ M , f(σ) is an f(Q)-term in N , so send σ to f(σ). If f(G)p is
a terminal condition in P , then the node indexed by f(G)p is terminal in the
Kripke ordering. Else iterate. That is, suppose f(G)p is non-terminal. The
structure at its node can be built in N . As an ultrapower ofM [G], N internally
looks like f(M)[f(G)]; internally, f(G) is f(P )-generic over the ground model
f(M). The structure at node f(G)p could be built in f(M)[f(G)p], where,
by the previous lemma, f(G)p is generic through f(P ), and also non-terminal.
Hence the construction just described, using an ultrapower and legal weaken-
ings to get additional nodes, can be performed in f(M)[f(G)p] just as above.
Continue through ω-many levels. We will ambiguously use f to stand for any of
the elementary embeddings, including compositions of such (making f a sort-of
polymorphic transition function). Notice that the construction relativizes: the
Kripke structure from node f(G)p onwards is definable in f(M)[f(G)p] just as
the entire structure is definable in M [G].
This defines a Kripke structure interpreting membership. Equality at any
node can now be defined as extensional equality beyond that node in this struc-
ture, inductively on the ranks of the terms, even though the model is not well-
founded, thanks to the elementarity present. That is, working at ⊥, suppose
σ and τ are terms of rank at most α, and we have defined equality at ⊥ for
all terms of rank less than α. Moreover, suppose (strengthening the inductive
assumption here) that this definability was forced in M by the empty condition
∅. At node f(G)p the structure is definable over f(M)[f(G)p], and, by elemen-
tarity, in f(M), ∅  “Equality in the Kripke model is unambiguously definable
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for all terms of rank less that f(α).” So at that node we can see whether there
is a witness to f(σ) and f(τ) being unequal. If there is such a witness at any
node f(G)p, then σ and τ are unequal at ⊥, else they are equal at ⊥. This
extends the definability of equality to all terms of rank α. Hence inductively
equality is definable for all terms.
Proposition 7. ⊥ 6 FAN∆.
Proof. It is immediate that B is a bar: any node is internally of the form
f(M)[f(G)p]; by the lemma, f(G)p is always f(P )-generic; by the proposition,
no path given by a Q-term can avoid the interpretation of the term for B as
given by an f(P )-generic. Moreover, B is decidable, as f(G)p agrees with G
on the standard part of 2∗, the only part that exists at ⊥, and that argument
relativizes to all nodes. However, B is not uniform at any non-terminal node,
since f(G)p, when non-terminal, has labels of ∞ at every level.
What remains to show is that our model satisfies IZF. In order to do this,
we will need to get a handle on internal truth in the model. This is actually
unnecessary for most of the IZF axioms, but for Separation in particular we will
have to deal with truth in the model. When forcing, this is done via the forcing
and truth lemmas: M [G] |= φ iff p  φ for some p ∈ G, where  is definable in
M . Since our Kripke model is built inM [G], statements about it are statements
within M [G], and so are forced by conditions in G. The problem is that the
Kripke model internally does not have access to G, but only to B. In detail,
Separation for M [G] is proven as follows: given φ and σ, it suffices to consider
{〈q, τ〉 | for some 〈p, τ〉 ∈ σ, q ≤ p and q  φ(τ)}. The problem we face is that
that set seems not to be in the Kripke model, even if σ is. What we need to
show is that if σ and φ’s parameters are Q-terms then that separating set is
given by a Q-term.
Recall that projQ operates by replacing all occurrences of ∞ by OUT.
Definition 5. p ∼ p′ if projQ(p) = projQ(p′).
Definition 6. p ∗ φ, for φ in the language of the Kripke model, i.e. when φ’s
parameters are Q-terms, inductively on φ :
• p ∗ σ ∈ τ if, for some 〈q, ρ〉 ∈ τ, q ≥Q projQ(p) and p ∗ σ = ρ.
• p ∗ σ = τ if for all p′ ∼ p, p′′ ≤P p′, and 〈q, ρ〉 ∈ σ, if projQ(p′′) ≤Q q
then there is a p′′′ ≤P p′′ such that p′′′ ∗ ρ ∈ τ , and symmetrically.
• p ∗ φ ∧ θ if p ∗ φ and p ∗ θ.
• p ∗ φ ∨ θ if p ∗ φ or p ∗ θ.
• p ∗ φ→ θ if for all for all p′ ∼ p and p′′ ≤P p′, if p′′ ∗ φ then there is
a p′′′ ≤P p′′ such that p′′′ ∗ θ.
• p ∗ ∃x φ(x) if, for some Q-term σ, p ∗ φ(σ).
• p ∗ ∀x φ(x) if for all for all p′ ∼ p, p′′ ≤P p′, and Q-term σ, there is a
p′′′ ≤P p′′ such that p′′′ ∗ φ(σ).
Lemma 8. If p ∼ p′ then p ∗ φ iff p′ ∗ φ.
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Proof. For the cases ∈,=,→, and ∀, that is built right into the definition of ∗.
The other cases are a trivial induction.
Lemma 9. If q ≤P p and p ∗ φ then q ∗ φ.
Proof. Inductively on φ. For ∈, use that projQ is monotone. The cases ∧,∨,
and ∃ are trivial inductions. For the remaining cases, suppose q′′ ≤P q′, q′ ∼ q,
and q ≤P p. Then q′′ ≤P q′ ↾ dom(p) ∼ p, and use that p ∗ φ.
Proposition 10. ⊥ |= φ iff p ∗ φ for some p ∈ G.
Proof. Inductively on φ.
σ ∈ τ : ⊥ |= σ ∈ τ iff there are p ∈ G and 〈q, ρ〉 ∈ τ such that projQ(p) ≤Q q
and ⊥ |= σ = ρ. Inductively ⊥ |= σ = ρ iff there is an r ∈ G ∗-forcing the same.
In one direction, using lemma 9, p ∪ r suffices, in the other we have p = r.
σ = τ : Suppose p ∈ G and p ∗ σ = τ . By taking p′ equal to p in the
definition of ∗, for every member ρ of either σ or τ , it is dense to ∗-force ρ
to be in the other set. By the genericity of G some such p′′′ will be in G, and
so inductively ρ will end up in the other set. This shows that σ and τ have
the same members at ⊥. Regarding a future node f(G)p′′ , because f(G)p′′ is a
legal weakening of f(G), p′′ ↾ dom(p) ∼ p, so again it is dense for any member
of σ or τ to be forced into the other, so they have the same members at node
f(G)p′′ . Hence ⊥ ∗ σ = τ.
Conversely, suppose for all p ∈ G p 6∗ σ = τ. That means there are p′ ∼
p, p′′ ≤P p
′, and ρ forced by p′′ into σ (without loss of generality), but p′′ has
no extension ∗-forcing ρ into τ . For every natural number n the set Dn = {q |
for some k > n, dom(q) ⊆ 2k, and all binary sequences of length k either are
labeled ∞ by q or some initial segment is labeled IN by q} is dense. Hence
cofinally many levels of G are in D0. Observe that if q is in D0 ∩G and q′ ∼ q
then any extension of q′ can be extended again to induce a legal weakening of
G. In N , by overspill choose p ∈ f(G) to be in f(D0). Choose p′′ ≤P p′ ∼ p and
ρ as given by the case hypothesis. Extend p′′ to p′′′ so that f(G)p′′′ is a legal
weakening of f(G). Since p′′′ has no extension ∗-forcing ρ into τ , inductively at
node f(G)p′′′ ρ is not a member of τ . Hence ⊥ 6|= σ = τ.
φ ∧ θ: Trivial.
φ ∨ θ: Trivial.
φ → θ: Suppose p ∈ G and p ∗ φ → θ. At any node f(G)p′ , if f(G)p′ |=
φ then inductively choose p′′ ∈ f(G)p′ such that p′′ ∗ φ. Without loss of
generality p′′ can be taken to extend p′. Since f(G)p′ indexes a node in the
model, p′ ↾ dom(p) ∼ p, so p′′ ≤P p′ ↾ dom(p) ∼ p. By the case assumption
there is a p′′′ extending p′′ with p′′′ ∗ θ. By the genericity of f(G)p′ there is
such a p′′′ in f(G)p′ . So inductively f(G)p′ |= θ. At node ⊥ the argument is
even simpler, as p′ can be chosen to be p. So ⊥ |= φ→ θ.
Conversely, suppose for all p ∈ G that p 6∗ φ → θ. That means there are
p′ ∼ p and p′′ ≤P p′ with p′′ ∗ φ but no extension of p′′ ∗-forces θ. As in
the = case above, in N , by overspill choose p ∈ f(G) to be in f(D0). Choose
p′′ ≤P p′ ∼ p as given by the case hypothesis. Extend p′′ to p′′′ so that f(G)p′′′
is a legal weakening of f(G). Inductively f(G)p′′′ |= φ, but since p′′′ has no
extension ∗-forcing θ, inductively f(G)p′′′ 6|= θ. Hence ⊥ 6|= φ→ θ.
∃x φ(x): Trivial.
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∀x φ(x): Suppose p ∈ G and p ∗ ∀x φ(x). For any node f(G)p′ and
any σ in the universe there, p′ ≤P p′ ↾ dom(p) ∼ p, so there is a p′′ ≤P p′
such that p′′ ∗ φ(σ). By genericity there is such a p′′ in f(G)p′ . Inductively
f(G)p′ |= φ(σ). So every element at node f(G)p′ satisfies φ there. At node ⊥
the argument is even easier, since p′ can be chosen to be p. Hence ⊥ |= ∀x φ(x).
Conversely, suppose for all p ∈ G that p 6∗ ∀x φ(x). That means there are
p′ ∼ p, p′′ ≤P p′, and Q-term σ such that p′′ has no extension ∗-forcing φ(σ).
As in the cases of = and → above, in N , by overspill choose p ∈ f(G) to be in
f(D0). Choose p
′′ ≤P p′ ∼ p and σ as given by the case hypothesis. Extend p′′
to p′′′ so that f(G)p′′′ is a legal weakening of f(G). Since p
′′′ has no extension
∗-forcing φ(σ), inductively f(G)p′′′ 6|= φ(σ). Hence ⊥ 6|= ∀x φ(x).
Theorem 11. ⊥ |= IZF
Proof. Empty Set and Infinity are witnessed by ∅ and ωˆ respectively. Pairing
is witnessed by {〈∅, σ〉, 〈∅, τ〉}, and Union by {〈q ∪ r, ρ〉 | for some τ 〈q, τ〉 ∈ σ
and 〈r, ρ〉 ∈ τ}. Extensionality holds because that’s how = was defined.
For ǫ-Induction, suppose ⊥ |= “(∀y ∈ x φ(y)) → φ(x).” If it were not the
case that ⊥ |= “∀x φ(x)”, then at some later node Gp there would be a term
σ with f(G)p 6|= φ(σ). The restricted Kripke model of node f(G)p and its
extensions is definable in a model of ZF, say N , which is a finite iteration of the
ultrapower construction, and so is itself a model of ZF. Hence, in N, σ can be
chosen to be such a term of least V -rank, say κ. Then at all nodes after f(G)p,
by elementarity, it holds that f(κ) is the least rank of any term not satisfying
φ. So all members of σ, being of lower rank, satisfy φ at whatever node they
appear. By the induction hypothesis, σ must also satisfy φ, contradicting the
assumption that some term does not satisfy φ.
For the powerset of σ take all sets with members of the form 〈q, τ〉, where
〈p, τ〉 ∈ σ and q ≤Q p.
It is easy to give a coarse proof of Bounding. The Kripke model can be built
in M [G]. Given a σ at ⊥, Bounding in M [G] can be used to bound the range
of φ on σ at ⊥. Also, the set of nodes is set-sized, so there are only set-many
interpretations of f(σ) at the other nodes, so the range of φ on them can also
be bounded. Since the standard ordinals are cofinal through the ordinals in all
of the iterated ultrapowers, by picking κ large enough, Vˆκ suffices for bounding
the range of φ on σ.
For Separation, given φ and σ, let Sepφ,σ be {〈projQ(p), τ〉 | for some 〈q, τ〉 ∈
σ with p ≤ q we have p ∗ φ(σ)}. By lemmas 8 and 10, this works.
Although this model does not satisfy FAN∆, it does satisfy ¬¬FAN∆, as the
terminal nodes are dense. Admittedly this is a rather weak failure of FAN∆. In
the final section, we will address the issue of getting stronger failures of FAN∆.
4 FAN∆ does not imply FANc
We will need a tree similar to that of the last proof. In fact, we will need two
trees: the c−bar C, and the decidable set C′ from which C is defined. (Both can
be viewed either as 2∗ with labels or as subtrees of 2∗.) Mostly we will focus
on C. Because FANc refers to eventual membership in a tree, the difference
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between IN and OUT nodes is no longer relevant: the bar is uniform beneath
any OUT node. So we can describe the forcing in terms similar to those before,
and with some simplifications introduced. The forcing partial order P will be
the set of appropriate labelings of finitely many nodes from 2∗. A labeling of
nodes assigns to each one either IN or ∞, with the following restrictions. Any
node labeled IN has no descendant, the idea being that once a node gets into the
eventual bar so are all of its descendants automatically, so nothing more need
be said. For any node labeled ∞, if both children are labeled, then at least one
of them must be labeled ∞. Let G be P-generic through the condition labeling
the empty sequence with ∞.
As before, we will need to look at weaker trees, ones with bigger bars.
Definition 7. H is a legal weakening of G if H can be constructed by choosing
finitely many nodes labeled ∞ by G, whose siblings are also labeled ∞ by G, and
changing those labels to IN and eliminating all descendants.
As before, each legal weakening H can be summarized by one forcing condi-
tion p, which consists of those nodes changed by H and their ancestors, labeled
as in G. H is then the set of conditions in G each minimally changed to be
consistent with p. Hence we refer to H as Gp.
Lemma 12. If Gp is a legal weakening of G then Gp is generic through p.
Proof. As in the corresponding lemma in the previous section.
Definition 8. Terms are defined inductively (through the ordinals) as sets of
the form {〈Bi, σi〉 | i ∈ I}, where I is any index set, σi a term, and Bi a finite
set of truth values. A truth value is a symbol of the form b+ or b′ or ¬b′, for
b ∈ 2∗ a finite binary sequence.
Definition 9. Let C be the term {〈{b+}, bˆ〉 | b ∈ 2∗}, and C′ be {〈{b′}, bˆ〉 | b ∈
2∗}.
In our final model, (the interpretation of) C will be the c-bar induced by
(the interpretation of) C′, and C will not be uniform, thereby falsifying FANc.
Furthermore, we will show that FAN∆ holds in this model.
We can now describe the ultimate Kripke model. Recall that G is generic
for P over M and labels the empty sequence with ∞. The bottom node ⊥ of
the Kripke model consists of the terms. At ⊥, b+ counts as true iff G(b) =
IN, b′ always counts as true, and ¬b′ never counts as true. Later nodes will
have different ways of counting the various literals as true. At any node, for
σ = {〈Bi, σi〉 | i ∈ I}, if each member of some Bi counts as true, then at that
node σi ∈ σ. This induces a notion of extensional equality among the terms.
One way of viewing this is at any node to remove from a term σ any pair 〈Bi, σi〉
if some member of Bi is not true at that node. Then each remaining 〈Bi, σi〉
can be replaced by σi. Equality is then as given by the Axiom of Extensionality
as interpreted in the model.
As for what the other nodes in the model are, there are two different kinds.
As in the last section, let N be an ultrapower of M [G] using any non-principal
ultrafilter on ω, with elementary embedding f : M [G] → N . This necessarily
produces non-standard integers. In N , any forcing condition p which induces a
legal weakening of f(G) will index a successor node to ⊥. At the node indexed
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by p, the universe will be the terms of N as interpreted by f(G)p. That is,
b+ is true if f(G)p(b) = IN, b
′ is always true, and ¬b′ never. Regarding the
embeddings from ⊥, for a term σ ∈M , f(σ) is a term in N , so send σ to f(σ).
In addition, definably over M [G], any non-standard c ∈ 2∗ with f(G)(c) = ∞
also indexes a node. At such a node c, b′ counts as true iff b 6= c, ¬b′ counts
as true iff b = c, and b+ counts as true iff b 6⊆ c (b is not an initial segment of
c). Note that at ⊥ any b′ refers only to a standard b; for some b′ to be declared
false at a later node c, b would have to equal c, and c indexes a node only if c is
non-standard. Hence there is no conflict with the Kripke structure: once b′ is
deemed true, it remains true. Similarly with b+: Gp is a fattening of G. Hence
membership, being based on finitely many truth values, is monotone.
Any node indexed by such a c ∈ 2∗ is terminal in the Kripke ordering. Also,
among nodes of the other kind, there is one trivial condition p, the one with
p(〈〉) = IN. This is also a terminal node, where each b+ and each b′ is true. At
any other node, iterate. That is, suppose p is not the preceding condition. The
model at p can be built in N . As an ultrapower of M [G], N internally looks
like f(M)[f(G)]. The structure at node p could be built in f(M)[f(G)p], where
f(G)p is generic through f(P ) (and non-trivial). Hence the construction just
described, using an ultrapower and legal weakenings and non-standard binary
strings to get additional nodes, can be performed in f(M)[f(G)p] just as above.
This provides immediate successors to nodes indexed by (non-trivial) p’s. Iterate
ω-many times.
The picture is that, at ⊥, C looks like G, that is, those nodes G assigns to be
IN. This tree gets fatter at later nodes that are legal weakenings. At terminal
nodes c, C is everything but the branch up to c. At most nodes C′ looks like
everything; at node c, where c is non-standard relative to its predecessor, we
find the one thing not in C′, namely c.
What we need to show is that this model satisfies IZF and FAN∆, and
falsifies FANc.
Lemma 13. ⊥ 6|= FANc.
Proof. It is easy to see that C is the c−set induced by C′: once b is forced into
C, none of its descendants index terminal nodes, so no descendant is forced out
of C′; similarly, if b is not forced into C, say at node p, then Gp(b) = ∞, and
in N some non-standard extension c of b will also be labeled ∞ by f(G)p, and
that c will index a node at which c is not in C′. Clearly, C is not uniform, and
C′ is decidable. So it remains only to show that ⊥ |= C is a bar.
Suppose σ is forced to be an infinite binary path at some node. If that
node is a terminal node, C contains cofinitely many members of 2∗, and so
certainly intersects σ. Else without loss of generality we can assume the node
is ⊥. Then, for some p ∈ G, p  “⊥ |= σ is an infinite binary path.” If it is
not dense beneath p to force the standard part of σ (that is, σ applied to the
standard integers) to be in the ground model, then extensions q and r of p force
incompatible facts about σ. The only incompatible facts about σ are of the
form b⌢0 ∈ σ and b⌢1 ∈ σ. The positive parts of q and r (that is, q−1(IN) and
r−1(IN)) induce a legal weakening of G. That is, there is a canonical condition
inpart(q, r), with domain dom(q) ∪ dom(r), that returns IN on any node that
either q or r returns IN on, as well as on any node if inpart(q, r) returns IN on
both children, else OUT. Because terms use only positive (i.e. IN) information,
at the node f(G)inpart(q,r), both b
⌢0 and b⌢1 are in σ. (More coarsely and
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perhaps more simply, at the node induced by the trivial condition sending the
empty sequence to IN, the same conclusion holds for the same reason.) Hence
⊥ could not have forced σ to be a path in the first place. Therefore p forces σ
on the standard binary tree to be in the ground model. It is easy to see that
generically G labels some node in σ IN.
Lemma 14. ⊥ |= FAN∆
Proof. By arguments similar to the above. If a set of nodes B is forced by p
to be decidable, then no extensions of p can force incompatible facts about B.
Hence B is in the ground model. If B were not a bar in the ground model,
there would be a ground model path missing B. This path would also be in the
Kripke model. Hence B is a bar in the ground model. Since the ground model
is taken to be classical, B is uniform.
Regarding getting IZF to be true, just as in the previous section, the prob-
lem is that truth in the Kripke model is on the surface determined by forcing
conditions in the ground model, to which the Kripke model has no access. The
essence is to capture truth at a node using those truth values that are allowed
in the building of terms.
Definition 10. For a forcing condition p, Bp = {b+ | for some initial segment
c of b, p(c) = IN}.
For a set of truth values B, B+ = B ∩ {b+ | b ∈ 2∗}. Also, B is positive if
B contains no truth value of the form ¬b′.
Definition 11. 1. ¬b′ ∗ B iff c+ ∈ B → c+ 6⊆ b′, c′ ∈ B → c 6= b, and
¬c′ ∈ B → c = b.
2. σ¬b
′
= {σ¬b
′
i | for some 〈Bi, σi〉 ∈ σ, ¬b
′ ∗ Bi}.
3. For φ(σ1, . . . , σn) in the language of the Kripke model, that is, with pa-
rameters (displayed) terms, φ¬b
′
= φ(σ¬b
′
1 , . . . , σ
¬b′
n ).
4. ¬b′ ∗ φ, for φ in the language of the Kripke model, if φ¬b
′
is true (i.e.
in V ). Note that φ¬b
′
is a formula with set parameters.
Definition 12. q ≤W p (q is a weakening of p as conditions) if for b ∈ dom(p)
either p(b) =∞ or for some initial segment c of b q(c) = IN.
The idea behind this definition is the q may change some∞’s to IN’s, as well
as extend the domain of p. Notice that ≤W is a partial order, and inpart(p, q),
from lemma 14, is the greatest lower bound of p and q.
Definition 13. p ∗ φ, for φ in the language of the Kripke model, i.e. when
φ’s parameters are terms, inductively on φ :
• p ∗ σ ∈ τ if for some 〈Bi, τi〉 ∈ τ with Bi positive, B
+
i ⊆ Bp and
p ∗ σ = τi.
• p ∗ σ = τ if
i) for all 〈Bi, σi〉 ∈ σ and q ≤W p, if Bi is positive and B
+
i ⊆ Bq then
there is an r ≤ q such that r ∗ σi ∈ τ , and symmetrically between σ and
τ , and
ii) for all b 6∈ dom(p), if for no initial segment c of b is c+ in Bp, then
¬b′ ∗ σ = τ .
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• p ∗ φ ∧ θ if p ∗ φ and p ∗ θ.
• p ∗ φ ∨ θ if p ∗ φ or p ∗ θ.
• p ∗ φ→ θ if
i) for all q ≤W p if q ∗ φ then there is an r ≤ q such that r ∗ θ, and
ii) for all b 6∈ dom(p), if for no initial segment c of b is c+ in Bp, then
¬b′ ∗ φ→ θ.
• p ∗ ∃x φ(x) if for some term σ p ∗ φ(σ).
• p ∗ ∀x φ(x) if
i) for all terms σ and q ≤W p, there is an r ≤ q such that r ∗ φ(σ), and
ii) for all b 6∈ dom(p), if for no initial segment c of b is c+ in Bp, then
¬b′ ∗ ∀x φ(x).
Proposition 15. If p ∗ φ and q ≤W p then q ∗ φ.
Proof. Trivial induction on φ.
Lemma 16. ⊥ |= φ iff p ∗ φ for some p ∈ G.
Proof. Inductively on φ.
σ ∈ τ : ⊥ |= σ ∈ τ iff for some 〈Bi, τi〉 ∈ τ every member of Bi is true at
⊥ and ⊥ |= σ = τi. The former clause holds iff Bi is positive and, for some
p ∈ G, Bi ⊆ Bp. Inductively, the latter clause holds iff, for some q ∈ G, Bq ∗
σ = τi. Given such p and q, p ∪ q suffices. The converse direction is immediate.
σ = τ : Suppose p ∈ G and p ∗ σ = τ. If q ∈ f(P ) indexes a node then
q ≤W p. If q |= ρ ∈ σ then inductively there is a q′ ∈ f(G)q, q′ ≤ q, such that
q′ ∗ ρ = σi ∧ σi ∈ f(σ) for some 〈Bi, σi〉 ∈ f(σ). By i) of the case hypothesis,
there is an r ≤ q′ with r ∗ ρ ∈ τ. Generically, there is such an r in f(G), so
inductively q |= ρ ∈ τ. If c indexes a node, then by ii) of the case hypothesis
c |= σ = τ . Hence ⊥ |= σ = τ.
Conversely, suppose there is no such p ∈ G. If p 6∗ σ = τ because clause i)
fails, then there is a witness q ≤W p to that failure. We say that such a q is close
to p if dom(q) ⊆ dom(p). That means that q comes from p by changing some
∞’s to IN’s and not adding anything else. Observe that if i) fails for p, then p
can be extended to p′ so that i) fails for p′ via a witness q close to p′. That’s
because dom(p′) can be taken to be dom(p) ∪ dom(q), for b ∈ dom(p) p′(b) can
be taken to be p(b), and for b ∈ dom(q)\dom(p) p′(b) can be taken to be q(b).
Therefore D = {p | p ∗ σ = τ, or p violates i) with a witness q close to p, or p
violates ii)} is dense.
Suppose there were a p ∈ G violating i) with a witness q close to p. Then q
induces a legal weakening f(G)q of f(G), and so indexes a node. By the choice
of q, q |= σi ∈ σ. If q |= σi ∈ τ then inductively that would be ∗-forced by
some r ≤ q. But by the choice of q there is no such r. Hence we would have
q 6|= σ = τ.
If there is no such p then every p ∈ G violates ii). Let p ∈ f(G) be such
that p ⊇ G. Since ii) fails for that p, then, with b from that failure, b indexes a
node, b 6|= σ = τ . In either case, ⊥ 6|= σ = τ.
φ ∧ θ: Trivial.
φ ∨ θ: Trivial.
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φ→ θ: Suppose p ∈ G and p ∗ φ→ θ. If q |= φ then inductively, for some
q′ ∈ f(G)q , q′ ∗ φ. Since we can take q′ ≤ q ≤W p, by i) of the hypothesis
there is an r ≤ q such that r ∗ θ. By genericity, there is such an r in f(G)q.
Hence q |= θ. If c |= φ then use ii) of the hypothesis.
Conversely, suppose there is no such p ∈ G. If p 6∗ φ → θ because clause
i) fails, then there is a witness q ≤W p to that failure, in which case p can be
extended to p′ so that i) fails for p′ via a witness q close to p′, where closeness
is as defined above in the case for =, for the same reason as above. Therefore
D = {p | p ∗ φ → θ, or p violates i) with a witness q close to p, or p violates
ii)} is dense.
Suppose there were a p ∈ G violating i) with a witness q close to p. Then q
induces a legal weakening f(G)q of f(G), and so indexes a node. By the choice
of q, q |= φ. If q |= θ then inductively that would be ∗-forced by some r ≤ q.
But by the choice of q there is no such r. Hence we would have q 6|= φ→ θ.
If there is no such p then every p ∈ G violates ii). Let p ∈ f(G) be such
that p ⊇ G. Since ii) fails for that p, then, with b from that failure, b indexes a
node and b 6|= φ→ θ. In either case, ⊥ 6|= φ→ θ.
∃x φ(x): Trivial.
∀x φ(x): As in the cases for = and → .
Lemma 17. ⊥ |= IZF
Proof. Just as in the last section, most of the axioms have soft proofs in this
model. The only issue is with Separation. Given φ and σ, let Sepφ,σ be {〈B, τ〉 |
for some 〈B′, τ〉 ∈ σ with B ⊇ B′ either i) B = Bp  φ(σ), or ii) ¬b′ ∈ B and
¬b′ ∗ φ}. By the previous lemma, this works.
As in the previous section, this model does not satisfy FANc, but does satisfy
¬¬ FANc. For further discussion, see the questions at the end.
5 FANc does not imply FANΠ01
Let G be P -generic exactly as in the last section. By convention, we say that
if G(α) = IN then G applied to any extension of α is also IN. Our goal is to
hide G a bit better than before, so FANc remains true, but not too well, so that
FANΠ0
1
is false.
Let N be an ultrapower of M [G] using a non-principal ultrafilter on ω. The
Kripke model has a bottom node ⊥, and the successors of ⊥ are indexed by
the labels 〈n, α〉, where n is a non-standard integer, and α ∈ 2∗ either has
non-standard length or G(α) =∞.
Definition 14. A truth value is a symbol of the form 〈n, α〉, ¬〈n, α〉, or 〈∀n, α〉,
for n a natural number (in the first two cases) and α ∈ 2∗. Admittedly truth
values of the first kind are also used to index nodes; whether truth values or nodes
are intended in any particular case should be clear from the context. Terms are
defined inductively (through the ordinals) as sets of the form {〈Bi, σi〉 | i ∈ I},
where I is any index set, σi a term, and Bi a finite set of truth values.
The sets at ⊥ will be the terms in M . The sets at any other node will
be analogous, that is, the terms in what N thinks is the ground model, i.e.
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⋃
κ∈ORD f(Mκ). At ⊥, 〈n, α〉 will always be true, ¬〈n, α〉 always false, and
〈∀n, α〉 true exactly when G(α) = IN. At node 〈m,β〉, 〈n, α〉 is true exactly
when 〈n, α〉 6= 〈m,β〉, ¬〈n, α〉 is true exactly when 〈n, α〉 = 〈m,β〉, and 〈∀n, α〉
true exactly when α 6= β. (Note that, perhaps perversely, the node 〈n, α〉 is
exactly the node at which the truth value 〈n, α〉 is false. The reason behind
this choice is that the node 〈n, α〉 is where something special happens to the
corresponding truth value. If preferred, the reader can call that node ¬〈n, α〉
instead.) This interpretation of the truth values induces an interpretation of
the terms at all nodes.
Let Tn be the term {〈{〈n, α〉}, αˆ〉 | α ∈ 2∗}. Let C be a term naming
the function that on input n returns Tn. Tn at ⊥ looks like the full tree 2
∗;
Tn at 〈n, α〉 looks like everything except α; and Tn at 〈m,α〉, m 6= n, again
looks like 2∗. The term for
⋂
n C(n) is given by {〈{〈∀n, α〉}, αˆ〉 | α ∈ 2
∗}, and is
interpreted as {α | G(α) = IN } at ⊥ and 2∗\{α} at 〈n, α〉. Notice that
⋂
n C(n)
is not closed under extensions.
The proof will be finished once we show that, at ⊥, FANc holds, IZF holds,
and
⋂
n C(n) is a counter-example to FANΠ01 .
Lemma 18. ⊥ 6|= FANΠ0
1
.
Proof. It is clear that Tn is decidable, and so
⋂
n C(n) is on the face of it Π
0
1.
It is also clear that
⋂
n C(n) is not a uniform bar. So it suffices to show that
⊥  “
⋂
n C(n) is a bar.”
Let ⊥ |= “Br is a branch through 2∗.” (Without loss of generality, it suffices
to start at ⊥ instead of at an arbitrary node.) Work beneath a condition
forcing that, so we can assume Br consists of sets of the form 〈Bi, αˆ〉, for
various α ∈ 2∗. If the standard part of Br, the part visible at ⊥, is in the
ground model M , then, by the genericity of G, Br will hit G (i.e. for some
α ∈ Br, G(α) = IN), which is how ⊥ interprets
⋂
n C(n). If the standard
part of Br were not in M , then contradictory facts about Br would be forced
by different forcing conditions. In particular, we would have p, q, and α with
p  “⊥ |= α⌢0 ∈ Br” and q  “⊥ |= α⌢1 ∈ Br.” That means there are
〈Bp, α̂⌢0〉 ∈ Br and 〈Bq, α̂⌢1〉 ∈ Br, with Bp and Bq consisting only of truth
values automatically true at ⊥ save for some of the form 〈∀n, α〉. But at some
node 〈n, α〉 with α non-standard, all of those latter truth values will be true.
Hence 〈n, α〉 |= “α̂⌢0, α̂⌢1 ∈ Br, ” so ⊥ could not force Br to be a path.
In order to prove the other facts, we will need to deal with truth at ⊥.
Definition 15. For a forcing condition p, let | p |, the length of p, be the length
of the longest α ∈ dom(p). Let Bp be {〈n, α〉 | n, length(α) ≤| p |} ∪ {〈∀n, α〉 |
length(α) ≤| p | and, for some initial segment β of α, p(β) = IN}.
Definition 16. 1. For B a finite set of truth values, ¬〈n, α〉 ∗ B iff 〈n, α〉 6∈
B, 〈∀n, α〉 6∈ B, and the only truth value of the form ¬〈m,β〉 in B is
¬〈n, α〉 itself.
2. σ¬〈n,α〉 = {σ
¬〈n,α〉
i | for some 〈Bi, σi〉 ∈ σ, ¬〈n, α〉 
∗ Bi}.
3. For φ(σ1, . . . , σn) in the language of the Kripke model, that is, with pa-
rameters (displayed) terms, φ¬〈n,α〉 = φ(σ
¬〈n,α〉
1 , . . . , σ
¬〈n,α〉
n ).
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4. ¬〈n, α〉 ∗ φ, for φ in the language of the Kripke model, if φ¬〈n,α〉 is true
(i.e. in V ). Note that φ¬〈n,α〉 is a formula with set parameters.
Definition 17. p ∗ φ, for φ in the language of the Kripke model, i.e. when
φ’s parameters are terms, inductively on φ :
• p ∗ σ ∈ τ if, for some 〈Bi, τi〉 ∈ τ , Bi ⊆ Bp and p ∗ σ = τi.
• p ∗ σ = τ if
i) for all 〈Bi, σi〉 ∈ σ and q ≤ p, if Bi ⊆ Bq then there is an r ≤ q such
that r ∗ σi ∈ τ , and symmetrically between σ and τ , and
ii) if n >| p |, and if either length(α) >| p | or for no initial segment β of
α do we have p(β) = IN, then ¬〈n, α〉 ∗ σ = τ .
• p ∗ φ ∧ θ if p ∗ φ and p ∗ θ.
• p ∗ φ ∨ θ if p ∗ φ or p ∗ θ.
• p ∗ φ→ θ if
i) for all q ≤ p, if q ∗ φ then there is an r ≤ q such that r ∗ θ, and
ii) if n >| p |, and if either length(α) >| p | or for no initial segment β of
α do we have p(β) = IN, then ¬〈n, α〉 ∗ φ→ θ.
• p ∗ ∃x φ(x) if for some term σ p ∗ φ(σ).
• p ∗ ∀x φ(x) if
i) for all terms σ and q ≤ p, there is an r ≤ q such that r ∗ φ(σ), and
ii) if n >| p |, and if either length(α) >| p | or for no initial segment β of
α do we have p(β) = IN, then ¬〈n, α〉 ∗ ∀x φ(x).
Proposition 19. If p ∗ φ and q ≤ p then q ∗ φ.
Proof. Trivial induction on φ.
Lemma 20. ⊥ |= φ iff p ∗ φ for some p ∈ G.
Proof. Inductively on φ.
σ ∈ τ : ⊥ |= σ ∈ τ iff for some 〈Bi, τi〉 ∈ τ every member of Bi is true
at ⊥ and ⊥ |= σ = τi. The former clause holds iff Bi contains nothing of the
form ¬〈n, α〉, and if 〈∀n, α〉 ∈ Bi then G(α) = IN. Given such a Bi, let p be a
sufficiently long initial segment of G forcing “σ = τi.” Such a p suffices. The
converse direction is immediate.
σ = τ : Suppose p ∈ G and p ∗ σ = τ. Then any member of σ at ⊥ is equal
at ⊥ to some σi, where 〈Bi, σi〉 ∈ σ and Bi ⊆ Bq for some q ∈ G. Then by the
hypothesis and genericity there will be an extension r of q in G forcing σi to be
in τ . At any other node 〈n, α〉, working in N , n is non-standard and so greater
than | p |, and α also satisfies the conditions in ii) (of the definition of ∗-forcing
equality), so “σ = τ” is true at these other nodes too.
Conversely, suppose there is no such p ∈ G. With reference to the definition
of ∗-forcing equality, observe that {p | p satisfies clause i)} ∪ {p | for some
〈Bi, σi〉 ∈ σ, Bi ⊆ Bp, yet p has no extension ∗-forcing σi into τ} is dense.
If G contains a member of the second set of that union, then the induced σi
witnesses that ⊥ 6|= σ = τ . If not, then G contains p satisfying i). So no p ∈ G
satisfies ii). This also holds in N . In N , take p to be an initial segment of G of
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non-standard length. The failure of ii) for that p produces an n and α which
index a node at which σ 6= τ , showing ⊥ 6|= σ = τ.
φ ∧ θ: Trivial.
φ ∨ θ: Trivial.
φ→ θ: Suppose p ∈ G and p ∗ φ→ θ. Then it is direct that ⊥ |= φ→ θ.
Conversely, suppose there is no such p ∈ G. With reference to the definition
of ∗-forcing implication, observe that {p | p satisfies clause i)} ∪ {p | p ∗ φ yet
p has no extension ∗-forcing θ} is dense. If G contains a member of the second
set of that union, then inductively ⊥ |= φ and ⊥ 6|= θ, hence ⊥ 6|= φ → θ. If
not, then G contains p satisfying i). So no p ∈ G satisfies ii). This also holds
in N . In N , take p to be an initial segment of G of non-standard length. The
failure of ii) for that p produces an n and α which index a node at which φ→ θ
is false, showing ⊥ 6|= φ→ θ.
∃x φ(x): Trivial.
∀x φ(x): As in the cases for = and → .
Lemma 21. ⊥ |= FANc
Proof. Suppose that at ⊥ we have a decidable set C′ ⊆ 2∗ inducing a c-bar C.
We would like to show that at ⊥ the c-bar C is uniform, which means that, for
some k, C contains every sequence of length at least k; in notation, C ⊇ 2≥k.
This is equivalent with C′ containing 2≥k, which is what we will prove.
Say that α ∈ 2∗ is good if there is a natural number k such that, whenever
n ≥ k and β ⊇ α has length at least k, ¬〈n, β〉 ∗ C′ ⊇ 2≥k. Observe that
if α⌢0 and α⌢1 are good then so is α (by taking k sufficiently large). So if
the empty sequence 〈〉 is bad (i.e. not good) then there is a branch Br0 of bad
nodes. For each α ∈ Br0, by the definition of badness, taking k to be the length
| α | of α, we have some β ⊇ α and n ≥| α | such that ¬〈n, β〉 6∗ C′ ⊇ 2≥k.
Because ¬〈n, β〉 ∗ φ is defined as the truth of φ¬〈n,β〉 in the classical universe
V , we can reason classically and conclude that there is a γ ∈ 2≥k such that
¬〈n, β〉 ∗ γ 6∈ C′. By choosing α’s of increasing length, we can get infinitely
many γ’s of increasing length, in particular infinitely many distinct γ’s. Hence
there is a branch Br1 such that each node in Br1 has infinitely many such γ’s
as extensions.
That was all in M . Now with reference to N , if α ∈ BrN0 has standard
length, then the corresponding choice of γ is also standard, since it’s the same
γ as in M . So if we choose a non-standard γ coming from the procedure above,
that γ came from a non-standard α. Since N |= “Br1 is infinite,” there is a
non-standard node on BrN1 , with some such γ as an extension; since the node
chosen from BrN1 was non-standard, so is γ, and hence so is the α that γ came
from. From α, we also have β ⊇ α and n ≥| α | with ¬〈n, β〉 ∗ γ 6∈ C′. In
particular, 〈n, β〉 indexes a node in the model. But at ⊥, C′ induces a c-bar, so
⊥ |= “there is a node δ ∈ Br1 such that δ ∈ C; that is, every extension of δ is
in C′.” This contradicts the choice of γ.
We conclude from this that 〈〉 is good. Fix k witnessing this goodness. We
will show ⊥ |= C′ ⊇ 2≥k.
First, if δ ∈ 2≥k is standard, then, for any n and β non-standard, ¬〈n, β〉 ∗
δ ∈ C′, so, with reference to the Kripke node 〈n, β〉, 〈n, β〉 |= δ ∈ C′. Since C′
is decidable, ⊥ |= δ ∈ C′.
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To finish the argument, we need only consider nodes 〈n, β〉, and show 〈n, β〉 |=
C′ ⊇ 2≥k. If β has length at least k, this follows from the goodness of 〈〉. The
only other case is β of length less than k such that G(β) = ∞. It suffices
to show that, for any such fixed β, in M there is a finite n such that, for all
m ≥ n, ¬〈m,β〉 ∗ C′ ⊇ 2≥k.
Toward that end, suppose not. Then for infinitely many m there is a γ of
length at least k such that ¬〈m,β〉 ∗ γ 6∈ C′. If those γ’s are of bounded
length then one occurs infinitely often. For that fixed γ, by overspill there is a
non-standard m such that ¬〈m,β〉 ∗ γ 6∈ C′. But 〈m,β〉 is a Kripke node, and
we already saw that, for δ ∈ 2≥k, ⊥ |= δ ∈ C′, which is a contradiction. Hence
there are infinitely many different γ’s. That means there is a branch Br2 such
that every node on Br2 has infinitely many different γ’s as extensions. Pick a
non-standard m such that the corresponding γ extends a non-standard node of
Br2. But again, ⊥ |= “C is a c-bar,” so ⊥ |= “there is a node δ ∈ Br2 such that
δ ∈ C; i.e. every extension of δ is in C′.” This contradicts the choice of γ.
Lemma 22. ⊥ |= IZF
Proof. As before, all of the axioms have soft proofs, save for Separation. Given φ
and σ, let Sepφ,σ be {〈Bi∪Bp, τ〉 | 〈Bi, τ〉 ∈ σ and p ∗ φ(τ)}∪{〈B, τ〉 | for some
¬〈n, α〉 ∈ B and some Bi, 〈Bi, τ〉 ∈ σ, ¬〈n, α〉 ∗ Bi, and ¬〈n, α〉 ∗ φ(τ)}.
By lemma 20, this works.
6 FANΠ01 does not imply FANfull
As usual, let G be generic as above. InM [G], the Kripke model will have bottom
node ⊥, and successor nodes labeled by those α ∈ 2∗ such that G(α) = ∞.
As is standard, terms are defined inductively, and always subject to the usual
restrictions so as to have a Kripke model. That is, to define the full model [9]
over any partial order 〈P,<〉, at node p ∈ P a term σ is any function with
domain P≥p such that σ(q) is a set of terms at node q; furthermore, with
transition function fqr for q < r, if τ ∈ σ(q) then fqr(τ) ∈ σ(r); finally, fpq is
extended to σ by restriction: fpq(σ) = σ ↾ P
≥q. That is called the full model,
because everything possible is being thrown in. For the current construction, we
will take a sub-model of the full model by imposing one additional restriction:
a term at any node α other than ⊥ must be in the ground model M .
Let C be the term such that ⊥ |= “βˆ ∈ C” (β ∈ 2∗) iff, for some initial
segment β ↾ n of β, G(β ↾ n) = IN, and, at node α 6= ⊥, α |= “βˆ ∈ C” iff β is
not an initial segment of α.
Lemma 23. ⊥ |= FANΠ0
1
Proof. If ⊥ |= “B ⊆ 2∗ is decidable” then, for any β ∈ 2∗, ⊥ |= “βˆ ∈ B” iff,
for some node α 6= ⊥, α |= “βˆ ∈ B” iff the same holds for all α 6= ⊥. Hence
⊥ |= “B = BˆM” for some set BM ∈ M . So if ⊥ |= “Bn is a sequence of
decidable trees,” then that sequence is the image of a sequence of sets from M .
Hence their intersection internally is the image of a set from M . So if
⋂
nBn
is internally a bar, it is the image of a bar, and by the Fan Theorem in M is
uniform.
Lemma 24. ⊥ 6|= FANfull
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Proof. At ⊥, C is not uniform, so it suffices to show ⊥ |= “C is a bar”. If
⊥ |= “P is a path through 2∗” then ⊥ |= “P is decidable”, and as above P
is then the image of a ground model path. Generically, for some β along that
path, G(β) = IN. For that β, ⊥ |= “P goes through βˆ and βˆ ∈ C.”
Lemma 25. ⊥ |= IZF
Proof. Not only are most of the axioms trivial to verify, in this case even Sep-
aration is too. Given a formula φ, term σ, and node nd, let Sepφ,σ(nd) be
{τ | τ ∈ σ and nd |= φ(τ)}. The reason that at node α this is in M is that, at
α, φ’s parameters can also be interpreted in M , and so truth at α is definable
in M .
7 Questions
• We have seen that FANfull holds in every topological model, and that
FANΠ0
1
holds in the model over any connected Heyting algebra. Are there
any other sufficient or necessary properties for any of the various fan the-
orems we have been considering to hold or fail in a Heyting-valued model?
• As a particular instance of the previous question, if a Heyting algebra
satisfies FAN∆ (resp. FANc), does it automatically satisfy FANc (resp.
FANΠ0
1
)?
• Although we were not able to make use of any Heyting algebras other
than Ω, some seem worthwhile to investigate, as possibly separating some
of these fan theorems, or perhaps having some other interesting properties.
We would include among these K(T ) for various natural spaces T , such
as 2N. We would also include other ways of killing points, such as over a
measure space τ with measure λ modding out by sets of measure 0:
U ∼ V ⇐⇒ λ(U) = λ(V ) = λ(V ∩ U)
(two opens are equivalent if their symmetric difference is of measure zero).
The space τ/ ∼ should be a Heyting algebra, which we will denote by
analogy withK as L(τ). Of particlar interest seem to be L(I) and L(I×I).
• In the models presented here, the principles in question were not true.
That’s different from their being false (meaning their negations being
true). We expect this could be done by iterating the constructions pre-
sented here. That is, to each terminal node of the model append another
model of the same kind, starting with the ambient universe of that termi-
nal node as the new ground model. By iterating this procedure infinitely
often, one is left with a Kripke model with no terminal nodes. In order
still to have a model of IZF, to get the Power Set Axiom for instance,
terms for all of these bars from the iteration might have to be present at
⊥, or perhaps some other fix would work. So this suggestion would at
least take some work to implement, and might even demand some new
ideas.
It would be even better, or at least different, if we had a model with
one fixed counter-example. Maybe the models presented here could be so
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tweaked. For instance, for FAN∆, could we just throw away the terminal
nodes? For FANc, it might work not to stop a node just because ¬b′ is
true, but rather to continue extending the node to allow finitely many ¬b′s
to be true. Or maybe a more radical idea is needed.
• One of the referees asked about the role of Choice here. It is not that
hard to see that Dependent Choice fails in most (or all) of these models.
Are there some nice choice principles that are true here? Are there other
models in which DC or other choice principles of interest hold? Are there
significant fragments of Choice that are incompatible with these separa-
tions?
• Within reverse classical mathematics, many weakenings of Weak Ko¨nig’s
Lemma (classically equivalent to the Fan Theorem) have been identified.
Of interest to us here is Weak Weak Ko¨nig’s Lemma. Whereas WKL
states that any bar (closed under extension, for simplicity) contains an
entire level of 2∗, WWKL states that any bar contains half of a level.
(WWKL has been shown to be connected to the development of measure
theory.) In our context, any of the principles we have been considering
could be so weakened, yielding Weak FAN∆, Weak FANc, Weak FANΠ0
1
,
and Weak FANfull. Clearly any principle implies its weak correlate (e.g.
FANΠ0
1
implies Weak FANΠ0
1
), and any weak principle implies the weak
principles lower down (e.g. Weak FANΠ0
1
implies Weak FANc), forming
a bit of a square. Are there any implications along the diagonal (e.g.
between FANc and Weak FANΠ0
1
)? Are these weak principles even natural
or interesting, by being equivalent with interesting theorems?
• Are there any other interesting principles to be found here, for instance
Π0n-FAN for n > 1, or adaptations of reverse math principles beneath
WKL other than WWKL?
References
[1] Michael Beeson, Foundations of Constructive Mathematics, Springer-Verlag, 1985.
[2] Josef Berger, The logical strength of the uniform continuity theorem, Logical Approaches
to Computational Barriers, Proceedings of CiE 2006, LNCS 3988, 2006, pp. 35–39.
[3] , A separation result for varieties of Brouwer’s Fan Theorem, Proceedings of
the 10th Asian Logic Conference (ALC 10), Kobe University in Kobe, Hyogo, Japan,
September 1-6, 2008, 2010, pp. 85–92.
[4] Errett Bishop and Douglas Bridges, Constructive Analysis, Springer-Verlag, 1985.
[5] Hannes Diener, Compactness under constructive scrutiny, Ph.D. Thesis, 2008.
[6] Hannes Diener and Iris Loeb, Sequences of real functions on [0, 1] in constructive reverse
mathematics, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 157(1) (2009), pp. 50-61.
[7] M. Fourman and J. Hyland, Sheaf models for analysis, Applications of Sheaves (Michael
Fourman, Christopher Mulvey, and Dana Scott, eds.), Lecture Notes in Mathematics,
vol. 753, Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 1979, pp. 280-301.
[8] William Julian and Fred Richman, A uniformly continuous function on [0,1] that is
everywhere different from its infimum, Pacific Journal of Mathematics 111(2) (1984),
pp. 333-340.
[9] Robert S. Lubarsky, Independence Results around Constructive ZF, Annals of Pure and
Applied Logic 132(2-3) (2005), pp. 209-225.
[10] Stephen Simpson, Subsystems of Second Order Arithmetic, ASL/Cambridge University
Press, 2009.
22
